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PERSPECTIVE

Influenza Virus Samples,
International Law, and Global
Health Diplomacy
David P. Fidler*

Indonesia’s decision to withhold samples of avian influenza virus A (H5N1) from the World Health Organization
for much of 2007 caused a crisis in global health. The World
Health Assembly produced a resolution to try to address the
crisis at its May 2007 meeting. I examine how the parties
to this controversy used international law in framing and
negotiating the dispute. Specifically, I analyze Indonesia’s
use of the international legal principle of sovereignty and its
appeal to rules on the protection of biological and genetic
resources found in the Convention on Biological Diversity.
In addition, I consider how the International Health Regulations 2005 applied to the controversy. The incident involving
Indonesia’s actions with virus samples illustrates both the
importance and the limitations of international law in global
health diplomacy.

O

n May 23, 2007, the World Health Assembly (WHA)
adopted a resolution on sharing influenza viruses and
promoting access to vaccines in connection with pandemic
influenza preparedness (1). This resolution constituted the
latest development in a controversy sparked by Indonesia’s
decision to withhold influenza A (H5N1) samples from
the World Health Organization (WHO) (2). The negotiations that produced WHA’s resolution involved complex
international legal questions, which stimulated different
answers from the parties involved. This article reviews this
controversy and analyzes key international legal issues it
generated.
Indonesia’s Decision to Withhold
Influenza A Virus (H5N1) Samples
This controversy began toward the end of 2006, when
Indonesia decided not to share influenza A virus (H5N1)
samples with WHO for risk assessment (e.g., surveil-
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lance) or risk management (e.g., vaccine development)
purposes. Indonesia’s decision reportedly stemmed from
its reaction to an Australian company’s development of
an avian influenza vaccine derived from a virus strain that
Indonesia provided to WHO (3). WHO’s acknowledgment that patents had been sought on modified versions
of influenza (H5N1) samples shared through the Global
Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN) without the consent of the countries that supplied the samples reinforced
Indonesia’s discontent. Indonesia argued that this incident
exposed inequities in the global influenza surveillance
system. Developing countries provided information and
virus samples to the WHO-operated system; pharmaceutical companies in industrialized countries then obtained
free access to such samples, exploited them, and patented
the resulting products, which the developing countries
could not afford. Avian influenza’s spread and fears about
pandemic influenza heightened this perceived inequity;
experts argued that developing countries would have little
access to vaccine for pandemic influenza without major
changes in global vaccine production (4,5).
Indonesia’s action alarmed the global health community. Indonesia has been hit hard by avian influenza (6), so
its cooperation in tracking the influenza virus (H5N1) was
critical. Without access to Indonesia’s influenza strains,
global surveillance was jeopardized, as was the refinement
of diagnostic reagents and the development of intervention
strategies, which depend on the information surveillance
provides.
Regaining access to Indonesia’s samples motivated
WHO to try to find a solution to the problem that Indonesia highlighted. In essence, Indonesia was making sample
sharing for risk assessment dependent on action taken by
WHO and industrialized countries to increase Indonesia’s
access to influenza vaccines derived from samples it pro-
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vided. Restarting sample sharing and improving vaccine
access proved difficult and contentious. Before the WHA
meeting in May 2007, negotiations between Indonesia and
WHO did not produce agreement. For example, neither the
Joint Statement issued by Indonesia and WHO in February 2007 (7) nor subsequent attempts to end the impasse
succeeded (8). Independent efforts to increase vaccines access, such as the agreement of the United States and Japan in March 2007 to provide $18 million to 6 developing
countries (Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Thailand, and
Vietnam) to facilitate the building of vaccine-manufacturing capacity and of a vaccine stockpile (9), did not alter the
stand-off.

desire to craft a more equitable system of global influenza
governance, the substantive elements of which remain to
be negotiated.

The World Health Assembly’s Resolution
Agreement at WHA was reached only through lastminute negotiations, which again illustrates the difficulties
raised by Indonesia’s strategy to gain better access to influenza vaccines. The WHA resolution sets out a series of
actions to achieve both “the timely sharing of viruses and
specimens” in GISN and the promotion of “transparent, fair
and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the generation of information, diagnostics, medicines, vaccines and
other technologies” (1). Most of the resolution consists of
requests by WHO member states for the director-general to
undertake activities designed to achieve fair and equitable
sharing of benefits derived from influenza surveillance activities, especially access to vaccines (Table).
Particularly important are the requests for the directorgeneral to convene a) a working group to review, and propose reforms for, the sharing of influenza viruses and their
use within and outside GISN; and b) an intergovernmental
working group to consider progress being made toward the
resolution’s goals, especially fair and equitable access to
influenza vaccine for developing countries. These requests
ensure that the linkage between virus sample sharing and
equitable access to influenza vaccine remains prominent on
the global health agenda for the foreseeable future.
The resolution reflects the current structure of global
influenza governance (10). International sharing of influenza virus samples has occurred for decades within GISN
(11). Although WHO and partners, such as the United
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and GAVI Alliance,
have increased developing-country access to childhood
vaccines, mechanisms for increasing these countries’ access to influenza vaccines are weaker. Fears about avian
influenza’s spread and the emergence of pandemic influenza highlighted the weakness of international efforts to
increase vaccine availability in developing countries. The
resolution attempts to build a multilateral process to address the lack of fair and equitable access for developing
countries to pharmacologic benefits derived from the sharing of influenza virus samples. The resolution expresses a

Table. Summary of actions that World Heath Organization
member states requested of director-general
• To identify and propose, in consultation with member states,
frameworks and mechanisms that aim to ensure fair and
equitable sharing of benefits among all member states, taking
strongly into consideration the specific needs of developing
countries
• To establish, in consultation with member states, an
international stockpile of vaccines for (H5N1) or other
influenza viruses of pandemic potential
• To formulate mechanisms and guidelines, in consultation with
member states, aimed at ensuring fair and equitable
distribution of pandemic influenza vaccines at affordable prices
in the event of a pandemic to ensure timely availability of such
vaccines to member states in need
• To mobilize financial, technical, and other appropriate support
from member states, vaccine manufacturers, development
banks, charitable organizations, private donors, and others to
implement mechanisms and increase the equitable sharing of
benefits as described in the resolution
• To convene an interdisciplinary working group to revise the
terms of reference of WHO Collaborating Centers, H5
Reference Laboratories, and national influenza centers, devise
oversight mechanisms, formulate draft standard terms and
conditions for sharing viruses between originating countries
and WHO Collaborating Centers, between the latter and third
parties, and to review all relevant documents for sharing
influenza viruses and sequencing data, based on mutual trust,
transparency, and overriding principles
• To assure a member of the interdisciplinary working group
consisting of 4 member states from each of the 6 WHO
regions, taking into account balanced representation between
industrialized and developing countries and including both
experts and policymakers
• To convene an intergovernmental meeting to consider the
reports by the director-general and by the interdisciplinary
working group, which shall be open to all member states and
regional economic organizations
• To commission an expert report on the patent issues related to
influenza viruses and their genes, and report to the
intergovernmental meeting
• To continue work with member states on the potential for
conversion of existing biological facilities, such as those for the
production of veterinary vaccines, so as to meet the standards
for development and production of human vaccines, thereby
increasing the availability of pandemic vaccines, and to enable
them to receive vaccine seed strains
• To report on progress on implementation of the resolution to
the World Health Assembly

Political Dynamics of Influenza Virus Samples
and Sovereignty over Biological Resources
The need to improve influenza vaccine access was recognized before this controversy (4,5), but Indonesia’s willingness to leverage control over virus samples to provoke
more multilateral responses to the access problem changed
the political dynamics of this issue. As typically happens
when countries or international organizations challenge the
status quo, the parties in this controversy framed their posi-
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tions by using international law. This section analyzes how
the stakeholders used international law to shape the debate.
This incident illustrated the importance and limitations of
international law in global health diplomacy.
By withholding samples, Indonesia asserted sovereignty over them because they originated within its territory.
Despite controversies surrounding it, the principle of sovereignty remains a central tenet of international law (12).
Traditionally, sovereignty holds that a state has authority
and control over the people, resources, and activities within
its territory (12). International law supplements sovereignty with the rule prohibiting states from intervening in each
other’s domestic affairs (12). Limits on sovereignty arise
when the state agrees to follow rules of international law
found in treaties or customary international law.
In essence, Indonesia claimed that the samples are its
sovereign property and do not constitute resources that
other countries or the international community can access
and use without Indonesia’s consent. This claim cut against
the ethos and practice of sample sharing under which GISN
had operated. This ethos and practice are based on accessing and analyzing influenza virus samples to produce accurate surveillance data, which inform development of interventions (e.g., vaccines).
Indonesia did not equate this ethos with an international legal obligation to engage in sharing that limited its
sovereign rights over the samples. From a legal perspective, Indonesia’s arguments were plausible. GISN was not
organized under treaty law, so no countries had treaty obligations to share samples. In addition, international law on
infectious diseases applicable to Indonesia when this controversy began contained no obligations to share samples
with WHO. The most relevant international legal rules, the
International Health Regulations (IHRs) adopted by WHO
in 1969 (IHR 1969), did not include influenza as a disease
subject to the Regulations, nor did IHR 1969 require sharing of biological samples for the diseases covered (13).
Whether sharing obligations arose under customary international law when this controversy arose is also doubtful.
To rise to the level of customary law, evidence must exist
that states generally and consistently follow a practice out of
a sense of legal obligation (12). GISN has, however, functioned without much, if any, reference to international law,
making it difficult to establish that countries shared samples
with WHO because they felt legally obligated to do so.
Sovereignty Claims and the Application
of Convention on Biological Diversity
In addition to exploiting basic principles of international law, Indonesia exploited precedents in other areas
to bolster its sovereignty claims over the samples. Specifically, Indonesia borrowed from the international law developed to address biological diversity. The Convention on
90

Biological Diversity (CBD) recognizes that countries have
sovereign control of biological resources found within their
territories (14). CBD defines biological resources to include
“genetic resources, organisms or parts thereof, populations,
or any other biotic component of ecosystems with actual
or potential use or value for humanity” (article 2). Genetic
resources are defined to mean “genetic material of actual
or potential value”; genetic material means “any material
of plant, animal, microbial or other origin containing functional units of heredity” (article 2). CBD further states that
“the authority to determine access to genetic resources rests
with the national governments and is subject to national
legislation” (article 15.1). In addition, “access to genetic
resources shall be subject to prior informed consent of the
Contracting Party providing such resources” (article 15.5).
Any access granted “shall be on mutually agreed terms”
(article 15.4).
Indonesia’s claims that it controlled access to samples
collected in its territory, that no use of such samples by other
parties could occur without its prior informed consent, and
that any use of such samples should produce benefits for
Indonesia reflect the approach taken in CBD. Evidence that
Indonesia framed the controversy by using these principles
can be found in WHA’s 2007 resolution, which states that
the Assembly “[r]ecogniz[es] the sovereign right of States
over their biological resources” (preamble).
However, equating influenza virus samples with biological resources addressed by CBD raises questions that
undermine Indonesia’s use of CBD. To begin, interpreting
CBD to apply to pathogenic viruses may be contrary to
CBD’s purpose. CBD was created, in part, to help developing countries rich in biological diversity control access to
this diversity to conserve and manage it for sustainable development. Developing countries were concerned that corporate entities from industrialized countries were accessing
their biological diversity and creating profitable products
without the populations of these developing countries benefiting. Critics called this practice biopiracy (15,16).
Thus, the biological and genetic materials of primary
CBD concern are indigenous resources in which governments, communities, and persons have invested time, effort, and resources to protect, cultivate, understand, and
use. CBD provides that “States have sovereign rights over
their own biological resources” (preamble [emphasis added]). In short, companies in the industrialized world were
unjustly enriching themselves by profiting from previous
efforts made in the developing country.
The avian influenza viruses affecting Indonesia are
not the kind of biological and genetic resources that CBD
sought to protect and regulate through the principles of sovereignty, prior informed consent, and mutual benefits from
access and exploitation. These viruses invaded Indonesia;
their presence and spread owes nothing to the investment,
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nurturing, and utilization of the Indonesian government
or people. Rather than seeking to conserve this virus, the
strategy is to contain and ultimately eradicate it. Applying
CBD’s principles to influenza virus samples seems inappropriate given the difference between CBD’s object and
purpose and the threat posed by influenza viruses.
State practice under CBD supports the conclusion that
CBD does not apply to avian influenza virus. States parties
to CBD have addressed avian influenza, not as a biological
resource subject to CBD but as a threat to biological diversity. CBD discussions of avian influenza have considered its potential impact on wildlife, and the CBD process
emphasized that surveillance is critical for combating avian influenza’s threat to biological diversity. Surveillance
suffers without sharing information and samples of avian
influenza viruses (17). Rather than protecting biological
diversity, as mandated by CBD, Indonesia’s withholding
virus samples from global surveillance efforts jeopardizes
biological diversity in addition to population health.
Using CBD as a template in the context of influenza
virus samples may be questionable on other grounds (18).
The definitions of biological resources and genetic resources emphasize that the resources in question should be of
actual or potential use or value for humanity. When these
definitions are read in conjunction with CBD’s principles,
this potential use or value for humanity is understood to
derive from the protection, conservation, and sustainable
use of the resources in question. CBD uses the principle
of sovereignty as a regulatory instrument to achieve these
goals. The use or value for humanity of influenza viruses
comes from their widespread sharing for surveillance and
vaccine development purposes because of the global threat
such viruses pose. In this context, the principle of sovereignty central to the CBD approach is not a useful basis for
facilitating timely and comprehensive sharing that global
health governance requires.
Virus Sharing and the Application of IHR 2005
One reason Indonesia stressed the CBD is that it provided a way to finesse the implications of the revised IHRs
adopted by WHA in May 2005 (IHR 2005) (19), which
provide that “[t]he provisions of the IHR shall not affect the
rights and obligations of any State Party deriving from other
international agreements” (article 57.1). Appeal to this rule
begs the question raised by the first sentence of article 57.1,
which states that “the IHR and other relevant international
agreements should be interpreted so as to be compatible.”
Thus, interpreting IHR 2005 became important in the controversy over influenza virus (H5N1) sharing. IHR 2005
is a treaty, “an international agreement concluded between
States in written form and governed by international law”
(20). This controversy represented an early test for how
IHR 2005 would be interpreted and applied.

IHR 2005’s use proved complex for technical and substantive reasons. Technically, IHR 2005 had no binding
force under international law until it officially entered into
force on June 15, 2007. Thus, IHR 2005 created no international legal obligations for Indonesia with respect to the
withholding of samples in the period before the Regulations
entered into force. However, IHR 2005’s imminent entry
into force made its substantive provisions relevant to the
negotiations over Indonesia’s position on virus sharing.
Under international law, a state must refrain from acts
that would defeat a treaty’s object and purpose when the
state has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty,
pending the treaty’s entry into force (20). Indonesia had
expressed its consent to be bound by IHR 2005 because
it did not reject IHR 2005, or submit reservations to it, by
the December 2006 deadline to do so. Thus, whether Indonesia’s decision to withhold samples constituted an act
that would defeat the object and purpose of the IHR 2005
became a relevant question. Criticisms that Indonesia’s action fundamentally jeopardized global health security—the
very object of IHR 2005 (21)—demonstrate that Indonesia
could be considered in violation of its duty to not defeat the
object and purpose of IHR 2005 before its entry into force.
This argument is supported by the claim that had IHR
2005 actually been in force, Indonesia would have violated its obligation to share samples. WHO Director-General Margaret Chan argued at the WHA meeting in May
2007 “that countries that did not share avian influenza virus would fail the IHR” (22). Addressing the credibility
of these legal claims requires interpreting what IHR 2005
mandates States Parties to disclose and share with WHO.
At least 2 differing interpretations exist. The first interpretation argues that IHR 2005 requires States Parties to share
relevant biological samples as part of the duty to provide
WHO with accurate and detailed public health information
about all events that might constitute a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC). Given that the
spread of highly pathogenic influenza viruses is considered
a PHEIC, the IHR 2005 mandates that States Parties provide WHO with samples for surveillance purposes without
preconditions or expectations of benefits in return.
Supporting this interpretation is a WHA resolution
adopted in May 2006, which called upon WHO member
states “to comply immediately, on a voluntary basis, with
provisions of the IHR 2005 considered relevant to the risk
posed by avian influenza and pandemic influenza” (para.
1) (23). This resolution urged WHO member states “to disseminate to WHO collaborating centres information and
relevant biological materials related to highly pathogenic
avian influenza and other novel influenza strains in a timely
and consistent manner” (para. 4[5]). The encouragement to
share biological materials with WHO could be considered
authoritative guidance from WHO’s highest policymaking
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body about the scope of the obligation to share public health
information with WHO with respect to all events that might
constitute a PHEIC.
This interpretation was succinctly stated by the US
delegation to WHA: “All nations have a responsibility under the revised IHRs to share data and virus samples on a
timely basis and without preconditions. The United States
wishes to be clear that our view is that withholding influenza viruses from GISN greatly threatens global public health
and will violate the legal obligations we have all agreed to
undertake through our adherence to IHRs” (24).
Even though IHR 2005 never expressly requires the
sharing of biological samples, a good faith interpretation of
IHR 2005 in light of its object and purpose acknowledges
a duty to share such samples for surveillance purposes. An
opposite interpretation could lead to a manifestly absurd or
unreasonable result, which treaty interpretation principles
do not support. This interpretation of IHR 2005 also is
compatible with CBD because IHR 2005 requires sample
sharing for risk assessment purposes, not risk management
activities. Thus, the sharing mandate in IHR 2005 does
not preclude WHO and its member states from crafting arrangements to improve access to benefits, such as vaccines,
derived from samples shared for surveillance purposes.
The second interpretation comes to the opposite conclusion. This position asserts that, under principles of treaty
interpretation, IHR 2005 does not require States Parties to
share biological samples with WHO. The first principle of
treaty interpretation is that a treaty shall be interpreted in
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light
of its object and purpose (20). IHR 2005 requires States Parties to provide WHO with “public health information” about
events that may constitute a PHEIC (article 6). IHR 2005
does not define what “public health information” means, so
its meaning has to be discerned through treaty interpretation
principles. The second interpretation holds that the ordinary
meaning of “information” encompasses knowledge and facts
(25) but does not include biological samples.
The second interpretation maintains that IHR 2005, its
negotiations, and the WHA resolutions of 2006 and 2007
support it. Nowhere does IHR 2005 contain any express
requirement to share samples of biological materials. The
only provision that refers to biological substances provides
that: “States Parties shall, subject to national law and taking into account relevant international guidelines, facilitate
the transport, entry, exit, processing and disposal of biological substances and diagnostic specimens, reagents and
other diagnostic materials for verification and public health
response purposes under these Regulations” (article 46).
The use of “biological substances” here suggests that the
negotiators considered this concept separate from “public
health information.”
92

The provision that contains the duty to communicate
public health information to WHO about a reported event
also contains a list of things that fall within this obligation: case definitions, laboratory results, source and type
of risk, number of cases and deaths, conditions affecting
the spread of disease, and the health measures used (article
6.2). This list refers to things that would fall within the
ordinary meaning of “information” and contains nothing
that could be considered biological samples, substances, or
specimens. The absence of express reference to biological
samples is particularly telling in light of the fact that WHO
and its member states were, at the time IHR 2005 was being
negotiated, aware of concerns about the failure of countries to share samples of pathogens of global concern (e.g.,
the severe acute respiratory syndrome virus, the influenza
[H5N1] virus) for surveillance and other purposes.
Similarly, an earlier negotiating text included the following provision: “In the context of a suspected intentional
release of a biological, chemical or radionuclear agent,
States shall immediately provide to WHO all relevant public
health information, materials and samples, for verification
and response purposes” (26). Here again, the negotiators
used “public health information” and “samples” as distinct
terms. Further, this provision does not appear in IHR 2005.
Even if it had so appeared, it would have underscored that
sharing samples was only required in connection with suspected intentional use of a biological, chemical, or radionuclear agent, which does not include the natural emergence
of avian or pandemic influenza.
WHA resolutions of 2006 and 2007 also support this
interpretation. The 2006 resolution on early compliance
with IHR 2005 with respect to influenza threats urges
WHO member states to disseminate to WHO “information
and relevant biological materials” (23) (emphasis added),
which further demonstrates that WHO member states consider public health information and biological materials
different, not equivalent, terms. WHA’s 2007 resolution
uses the same language in recalling the 2006 resolution’s
urging of WHO member states to disseminate information
and relevant biological materials (1). This interpretation is
also compatible with CBD because it leaves the decision
whether to share biological samples in the hands of the
state party in which the samples originate.
Beyond Differing Treaty Interpretations
and the WHA Resolution
Stepping back from the differing treaty interpretations,
Indonesia’s actions exposed ambiguity in a critical aspect
of IHR 2005 on the eve of its entry into force. The WHA’s
2007 resolution did not resolve this controversy because,
on this question, its provisions provide no clear answer.
The resolution reaffirms the obligations of States Parties
under IHR 2005 and the sovereign right of states over their
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biological resources, a key principle in CBD. The bargain
that underpins the resolution has, however, established the
utility of countries’ withholding samples to force WHO
and industrialized countries to address neglected aspects of
global influenza governance. Dueling treaty interpretations
may matter less than the old legal adage that possession of
property in dispute is nine-tenths of the law. When possession is cloaked in the principle of sovereignty, those who
require access to the property have to come to terms with
the need to bargain for it.
Conceptually, the WHA’s 2007 resolution seeks to
achieve equitable use of influenza virus samples. Such
equitable use encompasses timely sharing of samples for
global surveillance and more effort to ensure that developing countries share in the benefits of knowledge and technologies derived from the samples, especially influenza
vaccines. Equitable use has not occurred because sharing
influenza virus samples proves easier than producing equitable access to technologies derived from the knowledge
produced by surveillance. The resolution itself obviously
does not produce equitable use, but it establishes a WHObased process for moving global health diplomacy in this
direction. The resolution is a general blueprint for building
new global governance mechanisms on equitable use of
influenza samples. This blueprint is, however, technically
limited to influenza virus sharing and vaccine development, and its creation raises questions about governance of
the sharing of samples of other pathogens of global concern
and of benefits derived from such samples.
WHO and its member states had started the process
described in the resolution by, among other things, meeting in Singapore in July 2007 and scheduling another intergovernmental session in November 2007. The meeting
in Singapore did not produce consensus, and Indonesia
continued to withhold the samples (27). In reporting on the
Singapore meeting, Branswell observed that many feared
the talks would follow Indonesia’s lead and produce “a system where countries would exercise sovereign rights over
viruses or bacteria found within their borders, seeking quid
pro quos from vaccine makers or assessing the potential
for gain before co-operating with global health authorities to squelch new disease threats like SARS.” (28) Media reported in September 2007 that Indonesia had shared
some virus samples with WHO related to 2 fatal influenza
(H5N1) cases in Bali (29), but this action did not mean that
Indonesia had abandoned or repudiated the position it had
staked out on virus sharing and access to vaccine. Thus,
as of this writing, the fundamental issues at the heart of
this controversy, including the international legal questions
analyzed in this article, had not been resolved.
Whether the process sketched in WHA’s resolution
produces an effective multilateral regime for equitable use
remains to be seen. The process itself is not legally binding

because WHA resolutions do not have the force of international law (30). The agreement to create this process will
perpetuate legal disagreements about sovereignty, CBD,
IHR 2005, and other legal issues (e.g., intellectual property
rights) because neither side currently has an interest in having the legal questions definitively answered. Instead, constructive legal ambiguity informs the political willingness
of countries to shoulder the equitable use responsibilities
the WHA resolution envisions.
Mr Fidler is the James Louis Calamaras Professor of Law at
Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington, where he teaches international law and law related to homeland, national, and
international security. He is the author of International Law and
Infectious Diseases (1999); International Law and Public Health:
Materials on and Analysis of Global Health Jurisprudence (2000);
SARS, Governance, and the Globalization of Disease (2004);
and Biosecurity in the Global Age: Biological Weapons, Public
Health, and the Rule of Law (2008) (with Lawrence O. Gostin).
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